Count Axel Gustafsson Oxenstierna (1583-1654), Chancellor of Sweden, was born at Fond in Uppland, and was educated with his brothers at the universities of Rostock, Jena and Wittenberg. On returning home in 1603 he was appointed kammarjunker to King Charles IX of Sweden. In 1606 he was entrusted with his first diplomatic mission, to Mecklenburg, was appointed a Privy Council or Riksrådet during his absence, and henceforth became one of the king's most trusted servants. In 1610 he was sent to Copenhagen to prevent a war with Denmark, but was unsuccessful. This embassy is important as being the beginning of Oxenstierna's long diplomatic struggle with Sweden's traditional rival in the west, whose most formidable enemy he continued to be throughout life.
Axel Oxenstierna
Oxenstierna was appointed a member of
Gustavus Adolphus's council of regency. High aristocrat as he was, he would at first willingly have limited the royal power. An oligarchy guiding a limited monarchy was ever his ideal government, but the genius of the young king was not to be fettered, so Oxenstierna was content to be the colleague instead of the master of his sovereign. On the
January 6,
1612 he was appointed Chancellor of the Privy Council or
Rikskansler. His controlling, organizing hand was speedily felt in every branch of the administration. For his services as first Swedish plenipotentiary at the
Peace of Knäred[?] in
1613, he was richly rewarded. During the frequent absences of Gustavus in
Livonia and
Finland (
1614-
1616) Oxenstierna acted as his vice-regent, when he displayed manifold abilities and an all-embracing activity. In
1620 he headed the brilliant embassy despatched to Berlin to arrange the nuptial contract between Gustavus and Mary Eleanora of Brandenburg. It was his principal duty during the king's
Russian and
Polish wars to supply the
armies and the
fleets with everything necessary, including men and money. By this time he had become so indispensable that Gustavus, in
1622, bade him accompany him to Livonia, where Oxenstierna was appointed governor-general and commandant of
Riga. His services in Livonia were rewarded with four castles and the whole bishopric of
Wenden[?]. He was entrusted with the peace negotiations which led to the truce with Poland in
1623, and succeeded, by skilful diplomacy, in averting a threatened rupture with Denmark in
1624. On
October 7,
1626 he was appointed governor-general of the newly-acquired province of
Prussia. In
1629 he concluded the very advantageous
Truce of Altmark[?] with Poland. Previously to this (September 1628) he arranged with Denmark a joint occupation of
Stralsund, to prevent that important fortress from falling into the hands of the Imperialists.
After the
Battle of Breitenfeld[?] on
September 7,
1631 he was summoned to assist the king with his counsels and co-operation in
Germany. During the king's absence in
Franconia and
Bavaria in
1632 he was appointed legalus in the Rhine lands, with plenipotentiary authority over all the German generals and princes in the Swedish service. Although he never fought a battle, he was a born strategist, and frustrated all the efforts of the
Spanish troops by his wise regulations. His military capacity was strikingly demonstrated by the skill with which he conducted large reinforcements to Gustavus through the heart of Germany in the summer of
1632. But it was only after the death of the king at
Lützen that Oxenstierna's true greatness came to light.
As founder of the
Swedish postal service.
Stamp, 1936.
He inspired the despairing
Protestants both in Germany and Sweden with fresh hopes. He reorganized the government both at home and abroad. He united the estates of the four upper circles into a fresh league against the common foe (
1634), in spite of the envious and foolish opposition of
Saxony. By the patent of
January 12,
1633 he had already been appointed legate plenipotentiary of Sweden in Germany with absolute control over all the territory already won by the Swedish arms. No Swedish subject, either before or after, ever held such an unrestricted and far-reaching authority. Yet he was more than equal to the extraordinary difficulties of the situation. To him both warriors and statesmen appealed invariably as their natural and infallible arbiter.
Richelieu himself declared that the Swedish Chancellor was "an inexhaustible source of well-matured counsels." Less original but more sagacious than the king, he had a firmer grasp of the realities of the situation. Gustavus would not only have aggrandized Sweden, he would have transformed the German empire. Oxenstierna wisely abandoned these vaulting ambitions. His country's welfare was his sole object. All his efforts were directed towards procuring for the Swedish crown adequate compensation for its sacrifices.
Simple to austerity in his own tastes, he nevertheless recognized the political necessity of impressing his allies and confederates by an almost regal show of dignity; and at the abortive Congress of Frankfurt[?] in March 1634, held for the purpose of uniting all the German Protestants, Oxenstierna appeared in a carriage drawn by six horses, with German princes attending him on foot. But from first to last his policy suffered from the slenderness of Sweden's material resources, a cardinal defect which all his craft and tact could not altogether conceal from the vigilance of her enemies. The success of his system postulated an uninterrupted series of triumphs, whereas a single reverse was likely to be fatal to it. Thus the frightful disaster of Nördlingen on September 6, 1634 brought him, for an instant, to the verge of ruin, and compelled him, for the first time, so far to depart from his policy of independence as to solicit direct assistance from France. But, well aware that Richelieu needed the Swedish armies as much as he himself needed money, he refused at the Conference of Compiègne[?] in 1635 to bind his hands in the future for the sake of some slight present relief. In 1636, however, he concluded a fresh subsidy-treaty with France at Wismar. The same year he returned to Sweden and took his seat in the Regency. His presence at home overawed all opposition, and such was the general confidence inspired by his superior wisdom that for the next nine years his voice, especially as regarded foreign affairs, was omnipotent in the Privy Council.
Oxenstierna's Signature
He drew up beforehand the plan of the
Torstenson War[?] of
1643-
1645, so brilliantly executed by
Lennart Torstensson, and had the satisfaction of severely crippling Denmark by the
Peace of Brömsebro[?] in 1645, which put
Gotland,
Ösel,
Jämtland,
Härjedalen and for thirty years
Halland in Swedish hands. His later years were embittered by the jealousy of the young Queen
Christina of Sweden, who thwarted the old statesman in every direction. He always attributed the exiguity of Sweden’s gains by the
Peace of Westphalia following the conference in
Osnabrück to Christina’s undue interference, which merely gave Sweden
Pomerania,
Usedom,
Wollin,
Wismar and
Bremen-
Verden.
Oxenstierna was opposed at first to the abdication of Christina, because he feared mischief to Sweden from the unruly and adventurous disposition of her appointed successor, Charles Gustavus. The extraordinary consideration shown to him by the new king ultimately, however, reconciled him to the change. He died at Stockholm on August 28, 1654.